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Day of Departure
nN - 04.02.2011 11:42
Any social criticism of the current situation in Egypt and Tunisia should also include a description of a progressive position regarding foreign policy suited to these countries.
These countries have for long had a major role in the region supporting US and their western allies. Mubarak and Ben Ali along with others in the region have been puppets securing western interests whilst imposing their citizens and people throughout the region with unspeakable misery, war, political emancipation and economic hardship.
Western governments have been enjoying for decades a comfortable platform through these regimes to safeguard their interests and to launch their repressive policies against people and any opposition to their colonial agenda. That has included continuous interference in countries’ internal affairs, wars and plotting new ways to maximise their political and economic gains.
A political opposition which does not want to lead their people towards an independent foreign policy i.e. rejecting their countries’ hitherto puppet role has left itself open to regaining that role at a later time. People’s lives in the region have been directly or indirectly affected by foreign powers and now it is time to decide what their revolution should do with those powers. There is a dangerous political position which tries to harness and limit the aspiration of these revolutions and to keep the door to the known old role of their countries towards the West.
The revolutions in these countries must get clear with their past. They should reject the West and especially Israel which has committed too many crimes for too long to have any eligibility to play any role in the future of these countries. Mubarak and Ben Ali are the symbol of those repressions to which the fury of the people in the street is directed as a rejection of the colonial role and a cry for change. Any attempt to suppress or ignore their demand is a deliberate move towards, while shaping their countries according to, the western governments agenda.
Down with the colonial puppet!
Down with political and economic slavery!
March towards real freedom!
The sacred and courageous revolutions in the regions will wipe out the stronghold of slavery and bring dignity and prosperous future for the people. And that helps us in the West to root out the empire which has dominated the world too long and committed too many atrocities to deserve to keep their title. The empire of capitalism is shaking!
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2011/feb/04/egypt-protests-day-departure-live
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| Lees meer over: globalisering | | aanvullingen | | GOE POLICE BRUTALITY, NGO REGISTRATIONS | W.L.-31-01-2010 - 05.02.2011 02:57
10CAIRO147 2010-01-31 15:03 2011-01-28 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
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INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000147
SIPDIS
DRL FOR A/S POSNER
FOR NEA, NEA/ELA AND DRL/NESCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/31
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM EG
SUBJECT: A/S POSNER PRESSES GOE ON POLICE BRUTALITY, NGO
REGISTRATIONS
REF: CAIRO 47; 09 CAIRO 2164; 09 CAIRO 2064; 09 CAIRO 451
07 CAIRO 3214
CLASSIFIED BY: Margaret Scobey, Ambassador, State; REASON: 1.4(B),
(D)
¶1. KEY POINTS
-- (C) In meetings January 12-13, A/S Posner raised the issue of
police brutality and prison conditions with senior GOE officials.
-- (C) Interior Ministry State Security (SSIS) Director Hassan Abdel Rahman asserted that SSIS has not abused prisoners "in the past ten years." He claimed that the MOI played no role in the case of Cairo resident XXXXXXXXXXXX who, according to multiple NGOs, was abused repeatedly by police in January 2009. Rahman claimed there are no problems with prison conditions.
-- (C) MFA Deputy Assistant Minister for Human Rights Wael Aboulmagd said the GOE takes the issue of police brutality seriously, and has increased the number of prosecutions against offices for torture and abuse.
¶2. (C) Comment: Per ref B, credible human rights lawyers believe police brutality continues to be a pervasive, daily occurrence in GOE detention centers, and that SSIS has adapted to increased media and blogger focus on police brutality by hiding the abuse and pressuring victims not to bring cases. NGOs assess prison conditions to be poor, due to overcrowding and lack of medical care, food, clean water, and proper ventilation. Per ref E, following a landmark 2007 sentencing of police officers for assaulting and sodomizing a bus driver, courts have continued to sentence officers to prison terms for brutality. End comment.
--------------------------------------------- -----
Police Brutality and Prison Conditions
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶3. (C) In a January 12 meeting with Interior Ministry State Security Director Rahman, A/S Posner asked what measures the GOE takes to address police brutality and difficult prison conditions, and what the U.S. could do to help. Rahman said "in the past ten years" there has been "no abuse of prisoners at all." He acknowledged there may have been "some violations" against "terrorists" in prison in the 1970's and 1980's. Posner raised the case of XXXXXXXXXXXXX who was abused by police in XXXXXXXXXXX according to multiple NGO reports (refs C, D). (Note: The Ambassador raised this case with the Interior Minister in XXXXXXXX, per ref D. End note.) Rahman responded that when citizens do not "get what they want from the police, they become angry." He asserted that XXXXXXXXXXXXhusband is a "criminal," and beat her in the midst of a family dispute. Rahman said the MOI punishes any officer who commits violations. Rahman also said the Interior Ministry treats all prisoners well. More than 1,500 prisoners pursue university studies, he claimed, and he noted that the government is focused on prisoners' health and their rehabilitation.
¶4. (C) A/S Posner also raised police brutality with MFA Deputy Assistant Minister for Human Rights Wael Aboulmagd who responded that the GOE takes the issue seriously. Aboulmagd said that since 2005, the Interior Ministry stopped paying fines for police officers found to have abused detainees. He noted increased prosecutions against police officers for torture and abuse. Aboulmagd said the Interior Ministry is participating in human rights training through the UN Development Program, and internal courses. He opined that it would take a "generation of training" before the police accepted the concept of human rights.
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U.S. Support for Civil Society
---------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Rahman asserted that the U.S. funds NGOs and human rights organizations dominated by "communists and extremists." He claimed these "communists" do not care about democracy, and want to weaken the GOE in response to Egypt's movement away from the Soviet Union and toward the U.S. in the 1970's. The Ambassador pushed back, saying that the U.S. does not fund NGOs connected to the Muslim Brotherhood or extremists. She noted the U.S. funds NGOs to promote civic education, human rights training and election monitoring. She urged SSIS to allow increased registration of NGOs. A/S Posner urged Rahman to allow NGOs to register even if they are critical of the GOE.
¶6. (U) A/S Posner cleared this message.
SCOBEY
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10CAIRO147.html
| | EGYPT'S EMERGENCY LAW AND ITS BROAD USES | W.L. 12-01-2010 - 05.02.2011 03:06
10CAIRO64 2010-01-12 09:09 2011-01-28 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Cairo
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INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000064
SIPDIS
DRL FOR A/S POSNER
FOR NEA/ELA AND DRL/NESCA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER KDEM KIRF ELAB EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT'S EMERGENCY LAW AND ITS BROAD USES
¶1. KEY POINTS
-- Egypt's State of Emergency, in effect almost continuously since 1967, allows for the application of the 1958 Emergency Law, which grants the GOE broad powers to arrest individuals without charge and to detain them indefinitely.
-- The Emergency Law creates state security courts, which issue verdicts that cannot be appealed, and can only be modified by the president.
-- The Emergency Law allows the president broad powers to "place restrictions" on freedom of assembly. Separately, the penal code criminalizes the assembly of 5 or more people in a gathering that could "threaten public order."
-- Over the past two decades, the vast majority of cases where the government has used the Emergency Law have been to target violent Islamist extremist groups such as the Islamic Group and Al-Jihad, and political activity by the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the GOE has also used the Emergency Law in some recent cases to target bloggers and labor demonstrators.
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Broad Powers Granted to the Government
--------------------------------------
¶2. Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Egypt has almost continuously been under a State of Emergency. The State of Emergency allows for the application of the Emergency Law of 1958, which grants the government broad powers to restrict civil liberties by acting outside the civil and criminal codes. Article 3 of the Emergency Law allows the president to order "placing restrictions on personal freedom of assembly, movement, residence, traffic in specific areas at specific times," and "the arrest of suspects or individuals threatening public security and order," and arrests and searches without implementation of the law of criminal procedures..." In practice, the Interior Ministry carries out "the order" of the President either orally or in writing. Article 3 also authorizes surveillance of personal messages and confiscation of publications.
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Detention Under the Emergency Law
---------------------------------
¶3. Article 3 of the law stipulates that detainees can appeal an arrest order after six months in a state security court, and that the court's decision is subject to approval by the president. In practice, after 30 days in prison,detainees can demand court hearings to challenge detention orders. Detainees can re-submit demands for hearings every 30 days; however, a judge can uphold a detention order indefinitely. The Emergency Law does not mandate a maximum detention period, and therefore allows the government, subject to the approval of a State Security court and the president, to detain individuals indefinitely without charge.
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The Emergency Law's Court System
--------------------------------
¶4. Article 7 of the law creates state security courts. Three civilian judges preside over the courts, two of whom may be replaced by military judges appointed by the president. The law also establishes state security prosecutors who review cases and refer them to the state security courts. Per article 7, judges' verdicts in state security courts are final; there is no appeal process. Article 6 also stipulates that all state security court verdicts are subject to the review of the president, and Article 14 allows the president to modify sentences handed down by state security court judges.
--------------------------------------------- ------
Assembly under the Emergency Law and the Penal Code
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶5. Per para 2, the Emergency Law gives the president power to place "restrictions on personal freedom of assembly." Separately, in the penal code, law 10 of 1914 criminalizes the "assembly of five or more people in a gathering that could threaten public order or security." The law of meetings and demonstrations, law 14 of 1923 requires citizens to notify police prior to holding a gathering, and allows police to prevent a gathering from taking place and to dissolve a gathering once it is convened.
---------------------------------------
Terrorism Cases under The Emergency Law
---------------------------------------
¶6. During the 1990's when Islamist terror organizations such as The Islamic Group and Al-Jihad carried out a series of attacks, the government arrested and detained thousands of Islamists under the Emergency Law. Contacts estimate that about 4,000 to 5,000 of these detainees remain in prison. Under the Emergency Law, security forces detained groups of Bedouin in the Sinai in connection with investigations into terror attacks there in 2004, 2005 and in April 2006.
¶7. In late 2008, the government used the Emergency Law to arrest 26 members of a Hizballah cell, 18 of whom are Egyptian. The cell was allegedly working to target U.S. and Israeli ships transiting the Suez Canal. The case is now before a state security court. In July 2009, the government used the Emergency Law to arrest and detain a group of 25 Egyptians and one Palestinian. The group allegedly aided Hamas, assisted in the February 2009 bombing at the Khan Al-Khalili market in Cairo, and robbed a Cairo jewelry store owned by Copts. According to press reports, on January 4 a state security prosecutor transferred the case to a state security emergency court.
--------------------------------------------
Emergency Law Cases Not Related to Terrorism
--------------------------------------------
¶8. The government has also used the Emergency Law in cases not related to terrorism. The GOE jailed blogger Hany Nazir under the Emergency Law in October 2008 following posts deemed offensive to Christianity and Islam. The GOE has also imprisoned activist and blogger Musad Abu Fagr since December 2007 under the Emergency Law following posts about difficulties faced by Sinai Bedouin. In 2008, the government arrested a blogger from the heterodox Islamic Quranic sect under the Emergency Law, and detained him for approximately 90 days.
¶9. In recent years, the government has used the Emergency Law to arrest large numbers of Muslim Brotherhood (MB) members without charge in the run-up to the 2005 parliamentary elections, the 2008 local council elections and the 2010 parliamentary elections. The government released most of the detainees after holding them from periods ranging from a few days to several months.
¶10. The government used the Emergency Law to arrest and prosecute 49 individuals in connection to clashes that broke out between workers and police during an April 2008 labor strike in the Delta town of Mahalla. In December 2008, a state security court convicted 22 people on charges of assaulting police officers, robbery, and possession of unlicensed weapons. In 2004, a state security court convicted 26 men linked to the banned Islamic Liberation Party for belonging to a banned organization. Several defendants alleged the government tortured them to obtain confessions.
SCOBEY
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10CAIRO64.html
| | MOD OFFICIALS DISCUSS END-USE ISSUES | W.L. 11-08-2009 - 05.02.2011 03:21
09CAIRO1559 2009-08-11 11:11 2011-01-28 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3389
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 001559
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019
TAGS: PREL MASS ETTC PARM EG
SUBJECT: PDAS COUNTRYMAN MEETS WITH MOD OFFICIALS TO
DISCUSS END-USE ISSUES
REF: A. STATE 62775
¶B. CAIRO 1114
¶C. CAIRO 458
¶D. CAIRO 805
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. Key Points:
-- (C) On August 2, PM PDAS Tom Countryman led an interagency visit to Cairo to discuss recent potential violations of the Government of Egypt,s (GOE) end-use, retransfer, and security obligations involving U.S.-provided defense articles and defense services with the Ministry of Defense. He stressed the importance of Egypt demonstrating that it is taking concrete actions to prevent further violations.
-- (C) MOD agreed to continue an OMC-provided end-use training course, create a new MOD-administered periodic training course, name a high-level official to be a point of contact on end-use issues, and add end-use issues to the agenda for the annual Military Cooperation Committee meetings. MOD declined to sign any written agreement outlining these steps.
-- (C) Assistant Minister of Defense Mohammed al-Assar emphasized that Egypt took its end-use obligations "very seriously" and was taking "all measures" to prevent further incidents. He added that recent violations involved "junior officers making mistakes" without any high-level involvement.
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End-Use Monitoring Working Group
--------------------------------
¶2. (C) On August 2, PM PDAS Tom Countryman led an interagency visit to Cairo to discuss recent potential violations of the Government of Egypt,s (GOE) end-use, retransfer, and security obligations involving U.S.-provided defense articles and defense services (ref A) involving U.S.- origin equipment and technology with the Ministry of Defense. The delegation included representatives from PM/RSAT, NEA/ELA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff and U.S. Central Command. Major General Mohammed al-Assar, Assistant Minister of Defense for Policy, led the Egyptian side, accompanied by Major General Fouad Abdel Halim, Assistant Minister of Defense for Armament and Major General Ahmed al-Moataz, Chief of the U.S. Relations branch.
¶3. (C) Al-Assar said he had "high hopes" for establishing a "new dialogue" with the U.S. following President Obama's June speech in Cairo. Egypt's relationship with the U.S. is "tremendously important," he continued, viewing the military-military relationship as the "backbone" of bilateral cooperation. PDAS Countryman expressed appreciation for the strategic relationship with Egypt and strong security cooperation over the last 30 years.
¶4. (C) PDAS Countryman noted that overall, Egypt has a good record of protecting its large inventory of U.S. equipment and technology. Many countries, however, expend great energy to illegally obtain U.S. technology. In order to provide our partners with the best military equipment available, strict protections must exist to prevent compromise, he added. PDAS Countryman stressed the important role Congress plays in monitoring end-use compliance. He explained that the Department, through the PM Bureau, was required to notify Congress of any potential end-use violations.
¶5. (C) PDAS Countryman emphasized the importance of a clear and transparent picture of Egypt's end-use performance, including the measures being taken to prevent further violations. He noted that Egypt had more potential Section 3 violations than any other country in the world over the last several years. Cases involving the Chinese, he continued, were of particular concern (ref A). If Egypt cannot demonstrate that it is taking the necessary steps to prevent future violations, the necessary Congressional consent for important Foreign Military Financing (FMF)-funded programs could be delayed, such as M1A1 co-production and the proposed purchase of F-16 aircraft.
¶6. (C) SDO/DATT Major General Williams offered his assessment of the recent potential violations, saying that the cases demonstrated a lack of awareness amongst MOD officials on end-use rules. He explained that the Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) had already begun a training program for mid-level Egyptian officials to address the lack of awareness, noting that OMC had received full cooperation from MOD on delivering the course (ref B). General Williams added that the MOD had agreed to include end-use issues in the agenda for the annual Military Cooperation Committee meeting. He also highlighted the increase in third-party transfer requests from the MOD, indicating that the training program had increased awareness of end-use regulations.
¶7. (C) Major General Abdel Halim, who is responsible for the FMF program, stressed that Egypt follows all regulations, including the end-use, retransfer and security obligations included with every purchase of U.S. equipment made by the GOE. He noted that until the last four years, Egypt had no Section 3 violations, adding that the recent violations were a "minor thing" that could be overcome. On the recent violations, he said that MOD had been very transparent with the Embassy on discussing each individual case. Al-Assar stressed that Egypt takes its end-use obligations "very seriously" and was taking "all measures" to prevent further incidents. He said that recent violations involved "junior officers making mistakes" without any high-level involvement. In the case of the reverse engineering of a 155 mm gun tube (ref C), the MOD quickly fired the engineer involved and said the engineer "did not know it was a violation."
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Way Forward
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¶8. (C) PDAS Countryman acknowledged Egypt,s good faith efforts to report and redress apparent violations. He outlined several steps Egypt could take to demonstrate its commitment to preventing further end-use violations. Al-Assar replied that the MOD cooperated fully with OMC and was already taking the appropriate measures to prevent a reoccurrence, including naming a point of contact responsible for end-use issues. Al-Assar said that the MOD considered raising end-use awareness amongst its officials to be an important goal, but stressed that training had to be conducted "carefully" in order to prevent the appearance of "U.S. interference." Major General Abdel Halim suggested that the MOD could provide periodic training (every two months) to the "consigned officers" responsible for protecting U.S. equipment and technology under the auspices of the Armament Authority. This training would then filter down to the operators of U.S. equipment at the unit level. Having MOD officials quietly deliver the training, instead of Americans, would allow MOD to frame the training as "self-protection" of Egyptian equipment and not as a new restriction from the U.S.
¶9. (C) PDAS Countryman commented on the recent violations, saying that in the case of the 155 gun tube, MOD did the right thing by taking swift action against the engineer responsible, adding that the case did not raise much concern.
The case involving the visit of a Chinese military official to an F-16 base (ref D), however, did raise genuine concerns about the transfer of US technology. He noted that U.S. concerns over the visit had already delayed Egypt's request to purchase F-16 aircraft. PDAS Countryman stressed the importance of receiving a consistent story of what happened during the Chinese official's visit (Note: We have received conflicting reports from MOD officials on what the Chinese official saw during his tour. End Note). PDAS Countryman suggested that the MOD should conduct an internal analysis of the eight potential Section 3 violations over the last four years to identify the reason behind each violation, which would help guide any solution. An analytical review would also help determine if training is reaching the right
audience.
¶10. (C) Al-Assar did not respond directly, but said MOD was open to any program that would increase awareness of its end-use, retransfer and security obligations. PDAS Countryman urged the MOD to take proactive, concrete steps to demonstrate its determination to prevent future violations. He suggested MOD agree in writing to the following actions:
1) Conduct an internal analysis of the eight potential violations to be shared with the OMC,
2) Commit to an end-use training plan, and
3) Identify one senior official as a point of contact for end-use issues. PDAS Countryman understood MOD's reluctance to sign a document during the meeting, but promised to provide a text for the MOD's review. Al-Assar agreed to review the text for accuracy, but did not commit to signing any document.
¶11. (C) Subsequent to the meeting, al-Assar reviewed the proposed text, but declined to sign the document. He verbally concurred that the MOD would continue OMC-provided end-use training, create a new MOD-administered periodic training course, name a high-level official (MG Abdul Halim) to be a point of contact on end-use issues, and add end-use issues to the agenda for the annual Military Cooperation Committee meetings. He declined to conduct an internal analysis on the end-use violations.
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Mil-Mil Cooperation
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¶12. (C) At the conclusion of the end-use monitoring portion of the meeting, al-Assar raised several issues related to bilateral military cooperation. He urged the U.S. not to allow a third-party (Israel) to delay the political release of advanced weapons systems to Egypt. Al-Assar had "high hopes" that the new U.S. Administration would be more supportive of releasing weapons systems to Egypt. (Note: Egypt has long requested the release of certain weapons systems, like the TOW 2B, LONGBOW, and JAVELIN. Egypt is prevented from acquiring some systems because of Minister of Defense Tantawi's refusal to sign the necessary security agreement (CISMOA). The GoE also believes that concerns over Israel's Qualitative Military Edge have prevented weapons systems from being released to Egypt. End Note).
¶13. (C) Al-Assar also emphasized the importance of maintaining the 2:3 ratio for FMF provided to Egypt and Israel established after the Camp David Peace accord, in order to sustain the "regional balance." He noted that over the last 10 years, Israel's FMF level has grown substantially, while Egypt's annual FMF level has remained at $1.3 billion. The modernization of the Egyptian military was critical to Egypt's ability to defend its territory, he continued, stressing that "we want to proceed with our modernization plan with the United States." Any delay in the political release of weapons systems and Congressional conditioning of bilateral assistance was "not good" for the modernization plan.
¶14. (C) PDAS Countryman repeated that the U.S. appreciates the strategic importance of Egypt. While US political constraints on weapons sales are a real factor, they had not, he believed, prevented Egypt from building a military adequate to its regional responsibilities. He noted that Egypt could best help itself with the Administration and with Congress by insuring the proper protection of U.S. technology and equipment, and by continuing its efforts to interdict Iranian shipment of weapons bound for Hamas and Hizballah.
¶15. (U) PDAS Countryman cleared this cable.
SCOBEY
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/08/09CAIRO1559.html
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