

FROM HAYMARKET TO SACCO AND VANZETTI
ANARCHISM AND POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 1880s-1920s

LAW, STATE, AND SOCIAL CHANGE
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Alex Barnard
Professor: Peter Lindseth
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This paper represents my own work in accordance with University regulations.

Introduction

On May 3, 1886, the Chicago police fired into a crowd of strikers at the McCormick Reaper Works. The next day, a group of Chicago anarchists held a rally in Haymarket Square attended by thousands. As the last speaker took the podium, a group of policemen appeared and demanded that the assembly disperse. The organizers refused. Moments later, a bomb was thrown into the ranks of police, killing eight. The police responded by opening fire. Eight anarchists were arrested and, after a trial conducted with “malicious ferocity”¹ and unbridled prejudice, four were hung. The incident served as the “focus for all the raging passions of the day, including radicalism, mass immigration, and labor activism,” prompting the “first Red Scare in American history” and causing “international repercussions.”²

If the Haymarket Affair represented one bookend of the period in which anarchism “flourished”³ in the United States, the other end would most certainly be the Sacco and Vanzetti incident. Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti were Italian immigrants with long term affiliations with anarchist groups. The pair was falsely implicated in the April 15, 1920 murder of a paymaster and guard at a shoe factory in South Braintree, Massachusetts. After another sham trial and a long, international legal fight, the two were executed on August 23, 1927.

The two episodes hint that, while the goal of establishing a society without government has been the “impossible dream of mankind for centuries,”⁴ the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were a critical time for anarchism in the United State (indeed, elsewhere in the North Atlantic world). Anarchism fed off of technological innovations, such as the invention

¹ Paul Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), xi.

² Ibid, xii.

³ David Goodway, *For Anarchism: History, Theory, and Practice*, (London: Routledge, 1989).

⁴ Annemarie Springer, “Terrorism and Anarchy: Late 19th-Century Images of a Political Phenomenon in France,” *Art Journal* 38, no. 4 (1979): 261

of dynamite and new forms of transportation and communication,⁵ as well as “grave social tensions” to create a wave of assassinations and social havoc on a scale otherwise nearly impossible for a movement with a limited following.⁶ Nonetheless, from some perspectives, the anarchist terror of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century came and went with limited impact. The terror failed to change the governing system of a single country, and modern anarchist theorists have disowned the violence as a “temporary and sterile deviation”⁷ of an otherwise pacifist and peaceful ideology.

On the other hand, the differences in the way that the American state responded to the Haymarket and Sacco and Vanzetti Affairs indicate that the anarchist terror may have had a significant consequence unintended by its perpetrators: the growth of new and more modern forms of policing. Haymarket was a political demonstration organized openly with little interference from the police, and was suppressed with brute force only after it turned violent. On the other hand, the murders in Braintree were fundamentally criminal, rather than political acts. Sacco and Vanzetti were already under surveillance and living with the constant threat of deportation or arrest. The two events, then, reflected changes in policing tactics, policies, and institutions that occurred in the United States over this period.

The popular anarchist slogan “Our Civilization: The Bullet and Policeman’s Club”⁸ perhaps accurately reflects the extent to which the form of anarchism over this period was influenced by policing. This paper, argues, however, that policing itself was greatly influenced

⁵ Kevin O’Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson, *Globalization and History* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 221 highlights the significance of technical changes over this period.

⁶ Alexander Sedlmaier, “The Consuming Visions of Late Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Anarchists: Actualizing Political Violence Transnationally,” *European Review of History* 14, no. 3 (2007): 285.

⁷ Daniel Guerin, *Anarchism*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 5.

⁸ Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy*, 93.

by anarchism. Policing changes did not just coincide with the rise and fall of anarchy in the United States; they both fed off of and reinforced one another.

As I argue, the American policing system in the mid-nineteenth century was modeled after Great Britain, where ideals of liberalism emphasized the autonomy of society and the protection of the individual against the state and as such limited the extent to which preventative tactics could be used to suppress political dissent. By contrast, the German and French governments emphasized the right of society to have public order and safety, and as such allowed for more surveillance and constant repression of radicals. Using these tools, Germany was successful in suppressing anarchism in the late-nineteenth century, leading many anarchists to emigrate to the United States. There, police found themselves hampered by ideals of the sort of ‘liberal policing’ typical in the Anglo-American world.

“Causation is invariably multiple,”⁹ and as such, to claim a correlation between anarchist violence and the rise of modern policing shows or that the former caused the latter would be an overstatement. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that the anarchist terror of the 1890s – itself spurred on by steadily increasing repression – helped break the institutional inertia of American police institutions. Using trans-national networks of communication and transportation as well as new processes of international police cooperation, the U.S. appropriated elements of the French or German “high-policing” system of political repression. Anarchism, therefore, was critical in creating both the need and impetus for the centralization, specialization, and militarization of American police.¹⁰

⁹ Daniel Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 200.

¹⁰ Jennifer Davis, “Urban Policing and Its Objects,” *Policing Western Europe* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 1.

Liberal Policing in Great Britain and America

There are inevitably “considerable public order problems in trying to maintain order in a democratic context which tries to balance rights and constraints,”¹¹ to which different political systems offer different solutions. Particularly, historians have divided forms of policing between “high” and “low” policing, with the former acting as “moral custodians and political censors” while the latter are merely “legal actors and keepers of the peace.”¹² While “high” police project a constant, disciplining power that solidifies and protects the dominant regime, low policing seeks to stop crime, not agitation.

Another way to interpret this distinction is through the lens of the difference between nations with constitutions of ‘ordered liberty’ – Great Britain and the United States¹³ - versus those with constitutions of the ‘general will’ – France and, to some extent, Germany.¹⁴ In the first case, the main consideration is the protection of the rights of the individual against the state; hence, such systems tend to have substantial protections for the criminal.¹⁵ In systems of general will, on the other hand, the police seek to protect the community as a whole against the threat of both criminality and political instability.¹⁶

Great Britain in the nineteenth century had a nearly ‘ideal type’ of what I refer to as ‘liberal policing,’ or policing that protects the rights of the individual and limits the state’s power

¹¹ John Roach and Jurgen Thomaneck, *Police and Public Order in Europe* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 5.

¹² John Alderson, “Police and the Social Order,” John Roach and Jurgen Thomaneck, eds, *Police and Public Order in Europe* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 18.

¹³ John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), xv. Although the thrust of Brewer’s argument is that Great Britain actually had a powerful state in the nineteenth century, he accepts that the state did protect the personal liberties and rule of law on which the British prided themselves.

¹⁴ Peter Lindseth, “The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy,” *The Yale Law Journal* 113, (2004). Although, like Brewer, Lindseth avoids making an absolute black and white distinction between constitutions of ordered liberty and those of general will, the outlines of his argument suggest that France and Germany fell in the latter camp.

¹⁵ Alderson, “Police and the Social Order.”

¹⁶ Jean-Marc Berliere, “The Difficult Construction of a ‘Republican’ Police: The Experience of the French Third Republic,” *Policing Interwar Europe: Continuity, Change, and Crisis: 1918-1940* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 15.

to suppress and discipline individuals with opposing political viewpoints. The nation was marked by hostility to the “military style policing” found in its European neighbors.¹⁷ Britain, which by the end of the nineteenth century had not developed any high police,¹⁸ did not allow its police to suppress speech or monitor radicals to nearly the same extent as France or Germany.

These factors combined with liberal immigration policy – between 1823 and 1905 Britain did not refuse a single migrant entry¹⁹ - to make the nation a haven for political radicals. Britain was the “only country that took a moderate – even benign – attitude towards the treatment of international Socialism.”²⁰ Anarchist publications, like Henry Seymour’s *The Anarchist* and Kropotkin’s *Freedom* were openly published.²¹ While a meeting of British anarchists in 1912 noted that they were having difficulties finding spaces for anarchist conventions, they admitted that this was the product of the population’s hostility to their political views and not because of state action.²²

Probably not by coincidence, Britain avoided most of the anarchist violence of the late nineteenth century. Without the experience of repression of others in Europe, anarchists in Great Britain overwhelmingly rejected violence and claimed that they “threw intellectual bombs, not real ones.”²³ In fact, the only death caused by anarchism in Great Britain was that of Martial Bourdin – and he was not only not even British, but a French anarchist who died mishandling his

¹⁷ Clive Emsley, *Policing and Its Contexts* (London: MacMillan Press, 1983), 46.

¹⁸ Alderson, “Police and the Social Order,” 22.

¹⁹ David Feldman, “Was the Nineteenth Century a Golden Age for Immigrants?” Andreas Fahrmeier, Olivier Faron, and Patrick Weil, eds, *Migration Control in the North Atlantic World* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 169.

²⁰ His-Huey Liang, *The Rise of Modern Police and the European State System from Metternich to the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 88.

²¹ Benjamin Franks, “British Anarchisms and the Miner’s Strike,” *Capital and Class* 85, (2005), 231.

²² Joseph Buckman, “The 1912 Anarchist Conference in Leeds as Reported by the Local Jewish Group,” *Bulletin for the Society for the Study of Labor History*, 12.

²³ Buckman, “1912 Anarchist Conference,” 16.

own bomb in Greenwich Park in 1894.²⁴ In Britain, then, the chief impact of anarchism was on culture and literature – not on government institutions like the police.²⁵

Although the earliest systems of American policing were a “hybrid of selectively appropriated models imported from various countries,”²⁶ the chief model for police institutions going into the 1880s was Great Britain. As in the United Kingdom, pursuit of the ideals of liberalism “prevented police from aligning closely with the political dictates of government.”²⁷ Constitutional protections that assured rights of free speech and public assembly constrained the development of “high” police forces whose objective it was to maintain public order. The similarity to Britain was not merely a product of accidental institutional convergence, then: American leaders explicitly rejected the French and German systems of policing as counter-democratic.²⁸

Although between 1830 and 1870 the principal cities of the U.S. established police forces, they did so with no federal direction whatsoever. The U.S. system was fragmented and decentralized.²⁹ Chicago’s police force, which after Haymarket earned such a reputation for oppressiveness, was formed inauspiciously in 1851 when the city government constituted the force as the amalgamation of current constables and watchmen across the city.³⁰ In contrast to the militarized police of Germany, policing in the US was non-professional. With most officers elected, policing was not a career but another position used as patronage by the great political

²⁴ Haia Shpayer-Makov, “Anarchism in British Public Opinion, 1880-1914,” *Victorian Studies* 31, no. 4 (1988): 490.

²⁵ Matthew Thomas, *Anarchist Ideas and Counter-Cultures in Britain, 1880-1914* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2005).

²⁶ Mathieu Deflem, *Policing World Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 37.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 39.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 87.

²⁹ Emsley, *Policing and Its Contexts*, 103.

³⁰ Sidney Harring, *Policing a Class Society* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1983). 31.

machines of America's cities. These early departments are therefore best understood as part of Skowronek's "state of parties and courts,"³¹ and in many ways acted as a bridge between the two.

Like other institutions in post-Civil War America, police departments had what Rodgers calls "path dependency."³² The form police departments had taken conformed with popular conceptions of the limited role of government while simultaneously providing political parties an opportunity for control. Both of these factors made the departments highly resistant to change, and in turn limited the mechanisms, institutions, and personnel available to American governments as they sought to cope with the burgeoning social movements of the end of the century. In the early days of the U.S., magistrates in U.S. cities coped with riots by either convincing the rioters to come home, or by calling in the military.³³ Neither would prove to be a viable option for controlling the anarchists.

Policing in Comparative Perspective: France and Germany

If the origins of the American policing system in the mid-nineteenth century lay in England, the origin of the tools of repression it used at the end of the century lay in France. In contrast to the individual-rights centered practices of England, French policing focused on maintaining "public safety" through the identification, monitoring, and disciplining of entire populations deemed risky to the political order. By emphasizing prevention, the French system turned opinions into crimes and blurred the distinction between regulation and policing.³⁴

These ideological differences manifested themselves in French institutions for policing. In France, there was no clear division between soldier and policeman and both acted as "high"

³¹ Stephen Skowronek, *Building a New American State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 39.

³² Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings*, 150.

³³ Emsley, *Policing and Its Contexts*, 135.

³⁴ Francois Furet, *Revolutionary France: 1770-1889* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 497.

police.³⁵ In fact, “few questioned the need for *haute police*, most police posts in Paris were reserved for ex-soldiers, and the largest single police force, the *gendarmerie nationale*, was answerable to the minister for war.”³⁶ As a result of a “long tradition of civil disorder,” then, France maintained a “vast police apparatus” centralized in and controlled by the national government and, nominally, subsumed beneath the ‘general will.’³⁷ This bureaucracy was only strengthened after the Paris Commune, which had a substantial anarchist component, was brutally suppressed in 1870.³⁸

Under Napoleon, the French system of policing spread to much of continental Europe.³⁹ Even after the French Empire declined, Paris represented a ‘model city’ whose force other nations sought to emulate. Both these factors help explain the strong parallels between policing in France and Imperial Germany. There, the policeman was a “bureaucrat-soldier” beholden to both the state apparatus and army: “the policeman’s background was military, his overall appearance and habit was military, hierarchical structures within the police were military, and finally, the policeman’s attitudes and behavior towards the public were military.”⁴⁰ In Germany, police attended all radical meetings and wrote reports on them. They kept long lists of people suspected of left leaning politics. Newspapers were confiscated if articles offended the government.⁴¹ As in France, then, institutional and ideological configuration of German police allowed them to act preemptively against entire classes deemed detrimental to the public order.⁴²

³⁵ Deflem, *Policing World Society*, 47-58 and Emsley, *Policing and Its Contexts*, 146.

³⁶ Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger, “Introduction,” *Policing Western Europe* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), ix.

³⁷ John Roach, “The French Police,” Roach, John and Jurgen Thomanek, eds, *Police and Public Order in Europe* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 126.

³⁸ Furet, *Revolutionary France*, 503.

³⁹ Deflem, *Policing World Society*, 46.

⁴⁰ Herbert Reinke, “Armed as if for War: The State, the Military, and the Professionalization of Prussian Police in Imperial Germany,” *Policing Western Europe* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 56.

⁴¹ Andrew Carlson, *Anarchism in Germany: The Early Movement* (Metuchen: Scarecrow Press, 1972), 8.

⁴² Reinke, “Armed as if for War,” 62.

What these examples suggest, however, is that the difference between French and German system and British one was not just a quantitative one. French and German police were not just *more* repressive than British police and their forces were not simply larger. Rather, the different countries reflected fundamentally different conceptions about the role of the police: in one, the police were concerned with protecting individual rights, both of the criminal and the victim; in the other, they protected the community from the individual. These broad ideological differences filtered into the techniques used in each country, and suggest the depth of the shift that took place in the U.S. at the end of the century.

German Suppression of Anarchists

Germany provides possibly the first example of the deliberate manipulation of the threat of anarchism in order to bolster police power. In 1878, Max Hodel fired three times at a carriage holding Emperor William I. A few weeks later, Dr. Carl Eduard Nobiling trained a shotgun on the Emperor as he leaned out the window, seriously injuring his face. In response to the assassination attempt, police turned Berlin into a city under a “state of siege.”⁴³ Bismarck seized on the revelation that both men were tied to anarchist groups and the public’s widespread conflation of anarchism and socialism in order to push through an Anti-Socialist law banning socialist organizations, prohibiting their publications, and requiring political meetings to be pre-approved by police in advance.⁴⁴

The Anti-Socialist Law was intended to do more than just limit violence. With the law, the police in Germany were able to “regulate, at a desired level, the amount of anarchism they

⁴³ Carlson, *Anarchism in Germany*, 142.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 159.

wished to have in Germany.”⁴⁵ the government even went so far as to subsidize some anarchist groups through *agents provocateurs*.⁴⁶ Evidence of a continuing anarchist threat was useful because it ensured the re-passage of the Anti-Socialist Law, which in turn it provided a boost to Bismarck’s conservative allies in *Reichstag* elections vis-à-vis the socialists, who had a “vast and well organized” propaganda machine among the working classes.⁴⁷

Nuanced role aside, the Anti-Socialist Law proved disastrous for German anarchism. For a time, anarchists like Johann Most flaunted the law, smuggling the paper *Freiheit* into Germany from abroad using methods as colorful as carrying them in backpacks of vacationing hikers and sewing them into mattresses.⁴⁸ Eventually, however, Most and others gave up on Germany and moved to more fertile ground - the United States. By the 1880s, the German anarchist leadership was either “imprisoned, executed, or forced into exile.” When many of these anarchist emigrated to the U.S., the techniques that had repressed them, as we shall see, would eventually follow.

Early Policing of Anarchism in the United States

According to historian Paul Avrich, between 1880 and 1883 a revolutionary anarchist movement of “considerable proportions” took shape in the United States, fed largely by immigration.⁴⁹ This may be something of an exaggeration, as there were probably no more than 10,000 committed anarchists in the U.S. at any time,⁵⁰ and at its height in 1885 the Anarchist

⁴⁵ Ibid., 237.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 231.

⁴⁷ Liang, *Rise of Modern Police*, 104.

⁴⁸ Carlson, *Anarchism in Germany*, 207.

⁴⁹ Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy*, 55.

⁵⁰ Fine, Sidney, “Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley,” *The American Historical Review* 60, no. 4 (1955): 777.

International in the U.S. had at most 5,000 members.⁵¹ Nonetheless, in the 1880s, anarchism reached the apex of its political importance, organizing mass demonstrations and support for strikes. Indeed, the perceived threat of organized armed insurrection by anarchist militias was great enough that the Illinois State Legislature risked trespassing on the second amendment and banned all paramilitary groups.⁵²

It was in this context that a group of Chicago anarchists organized the Haymarket demonstration on May 4, 1886. In contrast to Germany, where “street marches were considered almost revolutionary and usually called forth a strong reaction from the police,”⁵³ the police in Chicago could do nothing to prevent the protest from taking place. Instead, they had to wait for some sort of criminal provocation. In fact, the Mayor of Chicago was in attendance, monitoring the rally; ten years later, after the anarchist wave of assassinations had begun, few politicians would dare go so close. Only after a bomb had been thrown did the police take action, and in contrast to the more subtle techniques of censorship and surveillance used in Germany, their response was an excess of violence so indiscriminate that modern accounts now believe that at least some of the police casualties were from their own frantic firing.⁵⁴

After the smoke cleared from the police riot, however, the changes in how America would now deal with radicalism became almost immediately evident. The Haymarket massacre prompted a “reign of terror” against every known revolutionary in Chicago. Within two days, fifty gathering places of anarchist groups were raided – including those of groups unconnected to

⁵¹ Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy*, 83.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 46.

⁵³ Richard Evans, “German Social Democracy and Women’s Suffrage 1891-1918,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 15, no. 3 (1980): 542.

⁵⁴ Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy*, 209.

the demonstration – and arrests were made without warrants or charges.⁵⁵ The similarity to German policing after the near assassination of Wilhelm I is hard to miss:

for nearly eight weeks, Chicago lived under what amounted to a system of martial law ... All constitutional rights were set aside. Mail was intercepted and opened. Anarchist papers were suppressed and their editors arrested. Trade union meetings were banned or dispersed, halls closed, files of organizations opened, and personal belongings confiscated – all without a shadow of legal process.⁵⁶

At the same time, the violence exposed the weaknesses of the American system of policing. The pursuit of anarchists quickly revealed the limited power of the national government's major domestic institution with inter-state reach, the postal service, which had until then only been deployed to control 'vices' like pornography.⁵⁷ Johann Most, now the leader of American anarchists, was arrested for "inciting to riot," but as Most had committed no specific crime, he went free.⁵⁸ Measures for preventing further violence also seemed insufficient. As one contemporary historian pointed out, in the absence of federal legislation an anarchist in 1886 "had the right to manufacture bombs and fill his house with dynamite, if he so pleased. There was no law against it."⁵⁹ Moreover, many questioned whether the heavy handed tactics used at Haymarket - 180 policeman were sent to suppress a crowd that had dwindled to only two or three hundred – were an efficient way to cope with the seemingly exponential rise of American radicalism.⁶⁰

Whether efficient or not, the post-Haymarket suppression dealt a huge blow to the anarchist movement. In the short term, the police had destroyed the burgeoning movement for the eight hour day that the anarchists at Haymarket had been supporting and helped to set back

⁵⁵ Ibid., 221.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 222.

⁵⁷ Daniel Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 4.

⁵⁸ Fine, "Assassination of McKinley," 783.

⁵⁹ George McLean, *The Rise and Fall of Anarchy in America* (New York: Haskell House Publishers, 1972), 66.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 103.

labor radicalism for decades.⁶¹ After the public trial of the Haymarket defendants, anarchism was, in the public's eye, "inseparably linked with terrorism and destruction."⁶² Many anarchists elected to disaffiliate with the label and quit anarchist organizations. Those anarchists that remained in the movement were seized with a sense of "helplessness and frustration."⁶³ Parsons had given himself up voluntarily to the authorities, assuming that his innocence would be enough to protect him. After his execution, many anarchists lost what limited faith they may have had in the system and realized that they could expect no clemency or mercy.

The anarchists did not, however, go away. As George Engel, one of the Haymarket defendants, stated at sentencing:

if the State's Attorney declares or thinks that after he has hanged these seven men and sent the other one to the penitentiary for fifteen years he has then killed anarchism, I say, that will not be so. Only the tactics will be changed, and that will be all. No power in the world will tear from the working man his knowledge and his skill or opportunity in making bombs.⁶⁴

Anarchist tactics indeed changed, but they did so in a way that reinforced public support for the policing methods that were the cause of their repression.

From Protest to Resistance

The anarchist 'martyrs' of Chicago claimed to be socialists and anarchists at the same time, apparently without any sense of contradiction.⁶⁵ The Haymarket prosecutor, on the hand, told the jury that "these men were not socialists, but anarchists," implying that the latter were far more dangerous from the former.⁶⁶ This prosecutor's distinction was one that socialists, both

⁶¹ Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy*, 454.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 428.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 406.

⁶⁴ McLean, *Rise and Fall*, 167.

⁶⁵ Guerin, Daniel, "Marxism and Anarchism," David Goodway, ed., *For Anarchism: History, Theory, and Practice* (London: Routledge, 1989), 119.

⁶⁶ McLean, *Rise and Fall*, 115.

internationally and domestically, were eager to maintain. In Germany after the passage of the Anti-Socialist Law, the Social Democratic Party increasingly emphasized reformist parliamentary politics over revolution.⁶⁷ In the United States, too, anarchist agitation for revolution became “deeply disturbing” to more moderate socialist and labor leaders.⁶⁸ In the hopes of avoiding similar repression to that unleashed after Haymarket, American socialists moderated their message, to the extent that “by the 1910s the reformist emphasis of the Social Democrats [socialists] made them practically indistinguishable from liberal Democrats and Progressives.”⁶⁹

Unsurprisingly, anarchists had never sought election to congress or even local office.⁷⁰ After Haymarket, though, the anarchists were pushed further to the fringes of the socialist movement.⁷¹ They responded by drawing sharper and sharper contrasts with the socialists: Vanzetti wrote that “they are authoritarian, while we are libertarian; they believe in a State or Government of their own; we believe in no State or Government.”⁷² While the socialists became more moderate in the face of oppression, then, the anarchists became more radical.

This ideological movement was mirrored by changes in group tactics. Following the assassination of the Russian despot Alexander II by the “People’s Will” in 1881:

governments throughout the continent ordered massive police repression, rounded up thousands of people and harassed or dissolved scores of labor organizations. This repression only convinced many anarchists that legal activity was pointless or impossible, and that terrorism was the revolutionaries’ only effective arm.⁷³

⁶⁷ Carlson, *Anarchism in Germany*, 77.

⁶⁸ Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy*, 94.

⁶⁹ Harring, *Policing a Class Society*, 96.

⁷⁰ Robert Gildea, *France 1870-1914* (London: Longman, 1988), 55. According to Most, congress was “nothing but a puppet show.” Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy*, 66.

⁷¹ Shpayer-Makov, *Anarchism in British Public Opinion*, 511.

⁷² Paul Avrich, *Sacco and Vanzetti: The Anarchist Background* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 36.

⁷³ Richard Bach Jensen, “Daggers, Rifles, and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in Nineteenth Century Europe,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 1 (2004): 126.

Beginning with the London Congress in 1881, anarchists increasingly spurned peaceful protest in favor of “propaganda by the deed,”⁷⁴ an action who Paul Brousse, the idea’s originator, saw as the province of individuals, not political parties. Anarchists acknowledged that not only had verbal and written propaganda been ineffectual, but these routes were being closed to them by increasing police repression.⁷⁵

Even had anarchist leaders continued to repudiate violence, their ability to control the way persons appropriated the anarchist label to justify individual acts was limited by organizational changes happening in anarchist groups in response to policing.⁷⁶ Large-scale anarchist groups capable of organizing massive strikes, demonstrations, and acts of civil disobedience had buckled under police pressure. In Germany, for example, the Radical Party, which had been a wing of the SPD, ceased its political actions and became a group “bent on the policy of terrorism.”⁷⁷ In the United States in the late 1880s, the Anarchist International split as a group labeled the “Autonomists,” splintered off to advocate direct action and decentralized violence by small independent cells.⁷⁸ By 1917, Italian anarchists in the U.S., “shunning large scale organization, operated in small, close-knit groups suitable for militant action that could be planned and executed without direction from above.”⁷⁹ Policing, then, helped to create the organizational forms and individual impetus for the anarchist terror that swept the western world in the late 1800s: the anarchist terror of the 1890s “was to no small degree a product of national governments criminalizing and exiling their initially rather peaceful critics.”⁸⁰

The Anarchist Terror

⁷⁴ Carlson, *Anarchism in Germany*, 252.

⁷⁵ Jensen, “Daggers, Rifles, and Dynamite,” 125.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 126. Moreover, “given anarchism’s emphasis on individual freedom and initiative, what the leaders thought about terrorism was much less influential than it would have been in other political ideologies and movements.”

⁷⁷ Carlson, *Anarchism in Germany*, 258.

⁷⁸ Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy*, 151.

⁷⁹ Avrich, *Savvo and Vanzetti*, 104.

⁸⁰ Sedlmaier, “Consuming Visions,” 286.

According to Geyer and Bright, in the late 1800s all the Atlantic nations were gripped by an “arc of violence” that included both wars and “widely prevalent” acts of “murder, mayhem, or riots.”⁸¹ Although the article omits any mention of anarchism, such an oversight is significant. What eventually came to be known as the “anarchist terror” got off to a slow start: in 1886, Charles Gallo threw a bottle of prussic acid into the Paris stock exchange, fired his revolver, and shouted ‘*Vive l’Anarchie.*’ For his efforts, the “only harm done was to the stockbrokers’ noses, which were assaulted by the acid’s abominable stench.”⁸² By the end of the century, though, the anarchists had made substantial progress in actualizing Most’s threat that “every prince will find his Brutus.”⁸³ Anarchists assassinated, among others, Sadi Carnot, President of France (1894), Antonio Canovas del Castillo, Prime Minister of Spain (1897), Empress Elizabeth of Austria (1898), Umberto I, King of Italy (1900), and William McKinley, President of the United States (1901).⁸⁴ By 1893, historian Richard Ely was concerned enough to state that anarchism had become “the most dangerous theory which civilization has ever had to encounter.”⁸⁵

A key element of anarchist violence, which magnified the actually rather limited scope of its killing, was its unpredictability. Presaging the ‘total war’ that marked the World Wars of the 20th century, the anarchists targeted “theatergoers, diners in restaurants, women, and even participants in religious celebrations” with tactics “previously reserved for soldiers, policemen,

⁸¹ Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, “Global Violence and Nationalizing Wars in Eurasia and America: The Geopolitics of War in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38, no. 4 (1996): 621, 623.

⁸² Jensen, “Daggers, Rifles, and Dynamite,” 132.

⁸³ Richard Laurence, “Rudolf Grossmann and Anarchist Anti-Militarism in Austria Before World War I,” *Peace and Change* 14, no. 2 (2001): 159.

⁸⁴ Shpayer-Makov, *Anarchism in British Public Opinion*, 490.

⁸⁵ Richard Ely, “Anarchy,” *Harper’s Weekly* 37, (1893): 1226.

and unpopular politicians.”⁸⁶ In 1894, the French anarchist Emile Henry threw a deadly bomb into the prestigious Café Terminus at Gare Saint Lazare. When interrogated by the police, he explained that “I wanted to show the bourgeoisie that henceforward their pleasures would not be untouched, that their insolent triumphs would be disturbed, that their golden calf would rock violently on its pedestal.”⁸⁷

The public responded with a great deal of hysteria. Fear of anarchism:

gripped not only capitalists and the authorities but public opinion in general. For a large segment of the population the anarchists had ceased to be human beings. They had become the incarnation of evil, monsters endowed with infernal powers, onto whom businessmen and ordinary citizens alike projected all that they dreaded and detested.⁸⁸

Even though “propaganda by the deed” was a practice adopted by, at most, a few thousand internationally, its unpredictability translated into ubiquity, in terms of the fear it caused. In France, “the police imagined they heard it [anarchism] whenever encountering resistance, although the culprit might be a tipsy railway clerk rather than a dangerous anarchists ... police and non-anarchists alike unwittingly collaborated in magnifying the anarchist menace out of all proportion to its true size.”⁸⁹

The International Response

Once governments committed to eradicating the anarchist threat, they were locked into a “chain reaction of repression and revenge.”⁹⁰ When anarchists were arrested and tried, their judges would find bombs underneath their porches and mailed to their offices, which only intensified the desire to bring anarchists to justice. Moreover, the police of the Atlantic world

⁸⁶ Jensen, Richard Bach, “The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898 and the Origins of Interpol,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 16, no. 2 (1981): 324.

⁸⁷ Sedlmaier, “Consuming Visions,” 291.

⁸⁸ Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy*, 177.

⁸⁹ Jensen, “Daggers, Rifles, and Dynamite,” 140.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 143.

could not afford to be passive or merely responsive in the face of violence targeted against high ranking state officials and monarchs. Widely publicized assassinations created strong pressures for the adoption of new tactics of repression. In Germany, one member of the royal court noted that:

The Crown Princess is terrified of attempts on her life. She recently discussed with somebody in great detail the further security measures which might be taken. She demanded a considerable increase in the police estimates and the formulation of a large and efficient secret police.⁹¹

In the United States, the situation was similar: in 1908, President Theodore Roosevelt declared that “when compared with the suppression of anarchy, every other question sinks into insignificance.”⁹²

Leaders quickly realized that anarchism was an explicitly international problem. Anarchists slipped through porous borders, and their ideas capitalized on new technology to jump quickly from country to country. No one state could effectively suppress anarchism by itself: Germany’s efforts to stop the dissemination of *Freiheit*, for example, were stymied by liberal British laws which allowed its continued publication.⁹³ Acknowledging this, the Italian government invited the nations of the Atlantic world to the “International Conference of Rome for the Social Defense Against Anarchists” from November 24 to December 21, 1898. The threat of anarchism was perceived great enough that 54 delegates from 21 countries – including the heads of national police of Russia, France, and Belgium – attended. At the conference, delegates passed resolutions encouraging governments to prohibit explosives, membership in anarchist groups, and giving aid to anarchists. They agreed that the death penalty should be the punishment for the assassination of any head of state.

⁹¹ Carlson, *Anarchism in Germany*, 274.

⁹² Jensen, “Daggers, Rifles, and Dynamite,” 117.

⁹³ Carlson, *Anarchism in Germany*, 208.

Ultimately, the *legislative* impact of the conference was limited; few of the laws the conference advocated were actually enacted.⁹⁴ When in 1904, the countries met again to adopt a binding “Secret Protocol for the International War on Anarchism” in St. Petersburg, the U.S., France, and Great Britain refused to sign, citing concerns about national sovereignty and distrust of cooperation with the other signatories.⁹⁵ Nonetheless, the influence on the “technical and administrative staff” in attendance at the conference, if not the diplomats and policymakers, was substantial.⁹⁶ The conference marked the first time that police agencies throughout Europe created direct exchanges of information, allowing them to create a “complex and very effective anti-anarchist dragnet that linked countries together bilaterally and in larger groups.”⁹⁷ Countries shared techniques that led to the creation of a standardized system of measuring and identifying anarchists based on the anthropometric methods popularized by Bertillon.⁹⁸ Furthermore, the conference normalized the expectations that police would constantly monitor anarchist groups, rather than simply chase them down after they committed acts of violence.

Perhaps the most important contribution of the conference was to change administrative codes governing asylum and extradition so that anarchists were considered criminals, not political dissenters.⁹⁹ From the conference onwards, the problem of anarchism was reframed in such a way that, in all of its manifold dimensions, it became understood as an “entirely and strictly criminal matter.”¹⁰⁰ Anarchists, in a sense, became an entire “dangerous class”¹⁰¹ that merited constant monitoring and disciplining. In this sense, the international conference laid the

⁹⁴ Deflem, *Policing World Society*, 72.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 68.

⁹⁶ Liang, *The Rise of Modern Police*, 162.

⁹⁷ Jensen, “The International Anti-Anarchist Conference,” 325.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 332. The “anthropometric” method drew on the growing popularity of eugenics by claiming that a series of measurements taken of the body and head could indicate an individual’s propensity for criminality.

⁹⁹ Liang, *The Rise of Modern Police*, 160.

¹⁰⁰ Deflem, *Policing World Society*, 70.

¹⁰¹ Emsley and Weinberger, *Policing Western Europe*, ix.

foundation for the modern practice of policing that focused on managing risk, rather than responding to individual acts.¹⁰² Moreover, the shift from treating anarchists as political dissidents to common criminals helped to justify increased repression in countries like the United States, where officials desired the legitimacy provided by the façade of continuing adherence to the tenets of liberal policing.

The Evolution of American Policing

Historian Daniel Rodgers has observed that “nations lie enmeshed in each others’ history. Even the most isolated of nation-states is a semi-permeable container, washed over by forces originating far beyond its shores.”¹⁰³ The period from 1880-1920 in the U.S. was marked by constant negotiation, adaptation, and mimicry of European models of social politics. Beyond social welfare, though, the American system of decentralized, non-political policing was also “washed over” by French and German ideologies and tactics of repression.

The U.S. had been unable to participate in the Rome Conference – despite an invitation – because the only federal agency capable of monitoring anarchists would have been the postal service.¹⁰⁴ The U.S. could not isolate itself, however, from either the violence or the response. In the 1890s, police officials frequently visited Germany to learn more about their system. A survey of the specialized literature on criminal justice published in the U.S. over this period confirms intense interest in German methods of policing.¹⁰⁵ Chicago, for example, adopted the

¹⁰² Jonathan Simon, “Megan’s Law: Crime and Democracy in Modern America,” *Law and Social Inquiry* 25, no. 4 (2000): 1111-1150.

¹⁰³ Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings*, 1.

¹⁰⁴ Jensen, “The International Anti-Anarchist Conference, 337.

¹⁰⁵ Deflem, *Policing World Society*, 163.

Bertillon system of measurement and physical profiling in order to facilitate tracking and monitoring anarchists who had emigrated from European countries.¹⁰⁶

It was the assassination of President McKinley by Leon Czolgosz in Buffalo New York on September 6, 1901 – and the confession the perpetrator signed indicating that he felt it was his “duty” to do under his anarchist ideology – that prompted the continental European models Americans had been observing for a decade to be in large part adopted.¹⁰⁷ In his opening message to Congress after the assassination, President Theodore Roosevelt announced that “we should war with relentless efficiency not only against anarchists, but against all active and passive sympathizers with anarchists.”¹⁰⁸ These efforts went beyond simply rooting out the perpetrators of the assassination, or the more localized repression after Haymarket.

Shortly after the assassination, Congress authorized the Comstock Act, which provided for prosecution of people circulating “indecent” mailings, to be used against anarchist publications, ending *Freiheit* in the U.S. just as it had been suppressed in Germany.¹⁰⁹ Although is generally overlooked by historians of the federal government in the nineteenth century, in this way anarchism clearly played some role in turning the Post Office into “the most feared and powerful moral agency the nation had yet known,”¹¹⁰ and, in a sense, the nation’s first institution that could conduct “high” policing. Other federal legislation dealing with fighting radicals proliferated. For example, the Ray Bill proposed that assaults on the president and other high-placed federal officials constitute a federal offense and that they be punished more severely than assaults on private persons. It denied citizenship to individuals who did not accept the value of

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 94.

¹⁰⁷ Fine, “Assassination of McKinley,” 780.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 790.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 785.

¹¹⁰ Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy*, 4.

organized government. The secret service was expanded and assigned to protect the president.¹¹¹ Anti-anarchist bills like this one successfully overcame states' rights objections, suggesting that crime control, as well as social welfare progressivism, was a powerful federalizing force.

Historian Sidney Harring notes that police forces grew rapidly in the last decade of the nineteenth century despite that violent crime rates were low or stable just before 1900.¹¹² Fear of anarchism helps reconcile how, in this context, rapidly expanding police forces would be accepted by and justified to a liberal democratic electorate. "No other single issue could legitimate as much police intervention in the lives of citizens" as the anti-anarchist issue.¹¹³ Police departments that, at the end of the civil war, were decentralized, informal, and based on patronage and elections closed the century as "1,000 man departments, spread over dozens of station houses, that patrolled many blocks of the city several times each day and possessed military capabilities to deal with strikes or other mass actions."¹¹⁴ The 1905 leader of Chicago's police force – which was now ten times its 1865 size – stated:

There are still in Chicago a large number of anarchists, but they are no longer defiant. They have been made to feel the effectiveness of the law when the community is aroused, and by all outward appearances, fear the law, if they do not respect it. They no longer indulge in incendiary talk calculated to incite acts of violence. Close surveillance is kept on the leaders by the police in Chicago, and they cannot make a move of any importance that is not known to the authorities in a short time.¹¹⁵

Twenty years after Haymarket, the increase in the police's level of sophistication, as well as the 'high' nature of their policing, is striking. Fighting anarchism gave a sense of legitimacy and necessity to police surveillance and harassment of radicals that helped break the strong path

¹¹¹ Fine, "Assassination of McKinley," 789.

¹¹² Harring, *Policing a Class Society*, 46.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 232.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 145.

dependence of American police departments, overcoming concerns about the role of police in a liberal democracy with growing fears about public order.

Immigration policies are at the “very front of processes of state formation in which both the boundaries of the state and roles of agencies are transformed,”¹¹⁶ and as such, nowhere were the institutional changes developed to combat anarchism more apparent than in immigration policy. Anarchism had been closely associated with immigration since the arrivals of Anti-Socialist Law émigrés from Germany in the 1870s. It was a “cherished myth” that violence in the American labor movement inevitably stemmed from foreigners,¹¹⁷ a conception reinforced by the fact that many anarchist publications in the U.S., such as *Freiheit* and *L’Anarchico*, were in foreign languages.¹¹⁸ At the Haymarket trial, a substantial point was made of the defendants’ limited command of English, and their execution was seen as a warning to foreign radicals that they could not come to the U.S. and abuse the right of free speech.¹¹⁹

Although proposals to change immigration policy to exclude anarchists appeared after Haymarket, it was the terror of assassinations that broke the Congressional deadlock. In 1901, Roosevelt told Congress that “we should aim to exclude absolutely all persons who are known to be believers in anarchistic principles or members of anarchistic societies, but also all persons who are of a low moral tendency or unsavory reputation.”¹²⁰ Lumping anarchists in with other criminal classes, Section 2 of the 1903 immigration bill – eventually deemed constitutional by the Supreme Court - banned anarchists from entering the country and provided for deporting those who “advise, advocate, teach” anarchist ideologies or “write, public, or circulate” anything

¹¹⁶ Feldman, “Golden Age for Immigrants,” 175.

¹¹⁷ Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy*, 35.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 46.

¹¹⁹ McLean, *Rise and Fall*, 93.

¹²⁰ Avrich, *Sacco and Vanzetti*, 130.

related to anarchism.¹²¹ The bill prompted what Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis Post termed a “deportations delirium”¹²² in which hundreds of anarchists – some having been in the United States for decades – were shipped back to Europe. The new immigration policy marked a major shift from liberal criminal protections. Deemed purely “administrative,” immigration proceedings suspended the right to counsel, appeal, or speedy trial,¹²³ facilitating far more efficient processing of anarchists deemed a threat to public order.

The changes in immigration policy, federalization of the police, and evolution of local departments marked a twenty year period in which police lived up to their claim that they would go to “extreme lengths of law” in order to deal with the “reds.”¹²⁴ As in Europe, however, police repression only bred more violence. Instead of organizing protest marches, by 1919 the U.S. anarchists, now in fragmented cells, planted bombs at the house of Senator Thomas Hardwick, chair of the Immigration Committee, and mailed bombs to John Rockefeller, J.P. Morgan, and thirty other prominent Americans. On June 2, 1919, a bomb went off outside Attorney General Palmer’s house, prompting the greatest “Red Scare” and anti-anarchist “reign of terror” in American history.¹²⁵

The Red Scare showed that in the U.S., as in Imperial Germany, the fear of anarchism would be used to suppress political radicalism more generally. In response to limited, sporadic (and largely harmless) anarchist violence,¹²⁶ the government used the Espionage and Sedition Acts to prosecute socialists, anarchists, and trade unionists groups. The anarchist’s unequivocal opposition to World War I and targeting of famous persons in power, though:

¹²¹ Ibid., 133.

¹²² Ibid., 134.

¹²³ Ibid., 128.

¹²⁴ Fine, “Assassination of McKinley,” 787.

¹²⁵ Avrich, *Sacco and Vanzetti*, 165.

¹²⁶ According to Avrich, *Sacco and Vanzetti*, 165, the only death caused by the thirty bombs sent by Italian anarchist to prominent Americans in 1919 was that of the bomber of Palmer’s house, who died when his bomb exploded prematurely.

brought down on them the full panoply of government repression. Throughout the country, anarchist clubhouses were raided, men and women beaten, equipment smashed, libraries and files seized and destroyed. Lectures and recitals were disrupted, newspapers and journals suppressed.¹²⁷

Far from the post-Haymarket fragmentation, the anti-anarchist dragnet encompassed multiple states and required substantial police cooperation. All in all, the Palmer Raids symbolized three critical trends that put U.S. policing on track to mirror a French model of militarization, centralization, and surveillance.¹²⁸

Despite their openly oppressive nature, the Palmer raids also revealed a new level of sophistication in policing techniques. Falling back on the theory used to convict the Haymarket conspirators, prosecutors argued that anarchists did not need to be directly involved in a specific plot to merit conviction; instead, they belonged to a class of persons that was itself dangerous and needed to be managed. Like Bismarck's *agents provocateurs*, police in New York used entrapment to bring down the "Bresci" anarchist group responsible for bombing St. Patrick's Cathedral.¹²⁹

These techniques were critical in developing the nascent Federal Bureau of Investigation, which had been formed in 1908, into the national government's first agency dedicated to "high policing."¹³⁰ Augmented with immigration officials, postal inspectors, and treasury examiners, the F.B.I. could do more than just track down anarchist criminals, but could also cut off the propaganda and financing that gave their groups life.¹³¹ While initially used only to track down the bombers of Palmer's house, an index file of anarchist agitators, groups, and publications

¹²⁷ Ibid., 94.

¹²⁸ Deflem, *Policing World Society*, 122.

¹²⁹ Avrich, *Sacco and Vanzetti*, 101.

¹³⁰ Alderson, "Police and the Social Order," 19.

¹³¹ Avrich, *Sacco and Vanzetti*, 167.

burgeoned to over 200,000 constantly updated items.¹³² By the end of 1920s, anarchists were being pursued “relentlessly” in what amounted to a “rout” of American radicalism.¹³³

The “Galleanist” anarchist group to which Sacco and Vanzetti belonged was already breaking up by 1920. Their compatriots were “stunned and demoralized” by the extent of the police repression that had been deployed against them,¹³⁴ and the pair were already fleeing from federal agents seeking their deportation and considering returning to Italy voluntarily. When Sacco and Vanzetti entered the town of Brocktown on May 5th, they were immediately arrested as “suspicious characters”¹³⁵ after a call from police in another state had warned local police to be looking out for a pair of Italian anarchists who had been implicated in a bank hold-up the month earlier. In terms of the surveillance, federal power, and police cooperation used against them, the arrest of Sacco and Vanzetti showed a police apparatus that had been almost wholly transformed in the previous thirty-five years.

Conclusion: The Decline of Anarchism and the Rise of the Policing

On September 16, 1920, after the indictment of Sacco and Vanzetti, another Italian anarchist, Mario Buda, placed a bomb in retaliation next to J.P. Morgan’s Wall Street Office. When the blast went off, Morgan was safe in a distant board room. Thirty-three of his employees were not so lucky, however, and died in the blast. Over 200 were injured.¹³⁶

This largest act of anarchist violence in the U.S. was also perhaps the last of any great significance. It marked the end of a cycle in which policing of anarchism provoked anarchist

¹³² Ibid., 167.

¹³³ Ibid., 196.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 196.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 199.

¹³⁶ Philip Cannistraro, “Mussolini, Sacco-Vanzetti, and the Anarchists: The Transatlantic Context,” *The Journal of Modern History* 68, (1996): 39.

reprisals. After the bombing, Buda – along with many of his colleagues – elected to leave the country. The anarchist movement in the United States withered, and by the mid-1920s, policymakers feared the “dictatorship of the proletariat” far more than “propaganda by the deed.”¹³⁷ When mass demonstrations were held in New York’s Union Square in 1927 on behalf of Sacco and Vanzetti, they were quickly dispersed by the police without incident.

Certainly, “in no country could anarchism be called a clear success. Nowhere did it in fact realize its millenarian goals of the destruction of the state and the concomitant emergence of an un-coerced, fully virtuous humanity. Nowhere did injustice, crime, and war disappear once and for all.”¹³⁸ While for some commentators, this failure is attributable to the inherently utopian and likely unworkable character of anarchism, even when compared to socialism and communism, it cannot be denied that changes in policing techniques played a role in bringing anarchists to their knees. The ramifications of anarchism, however, go beyond the confines of a single movement and a single time period.

Understanding the way in which the anarchists were suppressed might perhaps offer a better understanding of our own modern policing system. Between Haymarket and Sacco and Vanzetti, we can see what Foucault calls the “decline of the spectacle,”¹³⁹ in which police began to favor, when possible, more subtle techniques of discipline. The anti-anarchist movement marked the transition from the idea that “society as a whole” would judge one of its members to the point where one “social category,” such as the political radical, is judged to be harmful to public order.¹⁴⁰ The connection with the progressive concept of “risk management”¹⁴¹ shows

¹³⁷ Fine, *Assassination of McKinley*, 799.

¹³⁸ Laurence, “Anarchist Anti-Militarism,” 170.

¹³⁹ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (New York: Vintage Books, 1977): 8.

¹⁴⁰ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 276.

¹⁴¹ Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings*, 216.

how anarchism moved policing from handling individual cases to managing and controlling entire groups of people.

“Self-policing,” the “willing acceptance of police rule by a community that understands and endorses its mission,”¹⁴² is the ultimate goal of modern systems of governance. The rise of such a technique can clearly be facilitated by suppressing anarchism, a nearly universally reviled ideology which offered a great enough threat to encourage democratic polities to overlook their traditional commitments to individual rights in favor of public security. Indeed, the challenge that self-policing – the forfeiture of freedom in the name of order – poses for a liberal community is one that continues to challenge democracies today.

¹⁴² Liang , *Rise of Modern Police*, 12.

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